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NOLLAN AND DOLAN: THE END OF
MUNICIPAL LAND USE EXTORTION - A
CALIFORNIA PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment 1 of the United States Constitution
provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation."2 The Fifth Amendment re-
flects the thinking of the founders that property rights are
the natural by-product of liberty,3 deserving broad protec-
tion.4 Indeed, the framers viewed the preservation of prop-
erty rights as "the principal purpose of government."' While
the command of the Fifth Amendment appears clear enough,
in practice the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to define its
precise scope, as the multitude of cases on the subject
demonstrate.
A central and recurring theme in all takings cases is the
tension between the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
requirement and the exercise of the police power.6 Tradition-
ally, police power regulations have been sustained where the
state "'could rationally have decided' that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective."7
In its watershed decision of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,' however, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled its
intention to apply heightened scrutiny to takings claims.9
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Id. The Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. E.g., Chicago, B. &
Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
3. MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY 37-38 (1993).
4. Id. at 39.
5. Id.
6. The police power is "[tihe power of the State to place restraints on the
personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public
safety, health, and morals .... " BLAcies LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
7. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 (1987) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 466 (1981)).
8. Id.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 221-26. See also William A. Falik &
Anna C. Shimko, Recent Development in "Takings" Jurisprudence: The "Tak-
ings" Nexus - The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Plan-
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Specifically, Nollan held that a permit condition will consti-
tute a taking unless it is shown that an essential nexus exists
between the development condition and the purpose for im-
posing the condition.10 Alternatively stated, the condition
placed on the development permit must serve the same pur-
pose that a legitimate denial of the development permit
would.11
The trend toward higher scrutiny of police power regula-
tions of land use is clearly evidenced by the Court's most re-
cent takings decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard.2 In Dolan, the
Court answered an important question that Nollan left un-
resolved - namely, once an essential nexus is proven, "what
is the required degree of connection between the exactions
imposed... and the projected impacts of the proposed devel-
opment."13 The Dolan Court adopted a standard it termed
"rough proportionality." 4 This test mandates an individual
determination, made by the governmental entity, whether
the land use regulation is roughly proportional to the impact
the development will have on the community."
Following Nollan, however, California courts and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have taken a restrictive ap-
proach to the essential nexus test, applying it only to posses-
sory, as opposed to regulatory, takings claims.' 6 With the
adoption of the rough proportionality standard in Dolan, a
question arises as to how California courts and the Ninth Cir-
cuit will apply this newly minted test.
This comment examines whether California courts and
the Ninth Circuit should continue to apply the possessory-
regulatory takings distinction, or whether all takings claims
should be evaluated according to the analysis provided in
Nollan and Dolan.
The background section first examines the difference be-
tween possessory and regulatory takings, and the standards
ning: A View from California, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 390 (1988) ("Justice Scalia
... suggest[s] that the scrutiny the Court will utilize in reviewing land-use
decisions is more than the traditional, rational basis approach ...
10. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
11. Id.
12. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
13. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312.
14. Id. at 2319.
15. Id. at 2319-20.
16. See infra part II.D.
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the Court has used to evaluate each.17 This comment then
briefly analyzes U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in the
regulatory takings area prior to Nollan,'8 followed by an
analysis of Nollan itself' 9 and how courts in California and
the Ninth Circuit have interpreted that decision.2" Next, this
comment provides an overview of the California-Ninth Cir-
cuit regulatory takings standard,2' followed by a critique of
Dolan.22 The analysis section finds little support for the nar-
row approach taken by California courts and the Ninth Cir-
cuit regarding regulatory takings claims, given the language
and rationales behind recent U.S. Supreme Court takings ju-
risprudence, and cautions against further use of the reason-
able relationship test for evaluating regulatory takings.23
This comment proposes that California courts and the Ninth
Circuit apply the Nollan-Dolan analysis to all takings claims,
not just those involving real property.2 4
II. BACKGROUND
California courts and the Ninth Circuit have limited ap-
plication of the Nollan essential nexus test to possessory tak-
ings claims.25 With the arrival of the U.S. Supreme Court's
newest takings decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard,26 land use
commentators in California are questioning whether the
rough proportionality standard mandated by Dolan applies to
all takings claims, or just those involving possessory claims,
as the California-Ninth Circuit approach would suggest.2 7
Therefore, it is important to first understand the difference
between possessory and regulatory takings.28
17. See infra part IIA.
18. See infra part II.B.
19. See infra part II.C.
20. See infra part II.D.
21. See infra part II.E.
22. See infra part II.F.
23. See discussion infra part IV.
24. See discussion infra part V.
25. See infra part II.D.
26. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
27. See Charles V. Berwanger et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard: The United
States Supreme Court's Sequel to Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 17
REAL PROP. L. REP. 245, 248-50 (1994); Stephen K. Cassidy et al., Lessons from
Dolan: The Latest Word on Property Rights, CAL. REAL PROP. J., Summer 1994,
at 1, 4.
28. Certain broad principles appear to govern all takings claims, however.
An often repeated rationale given for the Takings Clause is that it "bar[s] Gov-
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A. The Difference Between Possessory and Regulatory
Takings
An historical examination of U.S. Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence reveals two broad types of takings - posses-
sory and regulatory.29 Each will be examined in turn.
1. Possessory Takings
The most obvious examples of possessory takings are
when on-site dedications of property are required from devel-
opers3 ° or when the power of eminent domain is used.31 One
commentator has defined a possessory taking as a physical
intrusion or occupation of private property by the govern-
ment or an authorized third person.3 2 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 3
issued a clear rule as to what constitutes a possessory taking.
In Loretto, a New York law required a landlord to permit
a cable television company to install cable equipment upon
his property.3 4 The Court held that where a governmental
action involves a permanent physical occupation of property,
a taking will be found to the extent of the occupation, "with-
out regard to whether the action achieves an important pub-
lic benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner."3 5 The Court's rationale was that a permanent physi-
cal occupation destroys the owner's "bundle" of property
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
29. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992).
30. On-site dedications involve dedications of land within a development to
the municipality for the construction of needed infrastructure like streets, side-
walks, utilities, etc., or the construction of such infrastructure by the developer
which is then dedicated to the community. Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 479-80 (1991).
31. Eminent domain is "[tihe power to take private property for public use
by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to
exercise functions of public character." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed.
1990). The power of eminent domain may not be exercised "without just com-
pensation to the owners of the property which is taken." Id.
32. See, e.g., Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings
Clause, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 925, 939.
33. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
34. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421.
35. Id. at 434-35.
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rights.36 Additionally, the Court held that the size of the per-
manent physical occupation is irrelevant in determining
whether or not a taking has occurred.37
2. Regulatory Takings
The U.S. Supreme Court has given no definitive rule as
to when a regulatory taking occurs. Justice O'Connor, in Yee
v. City of Escondido,38  distinguished takings involving a
physical occupation of property from those in which the gov-
ernment regulates the use of the property, such that "the pur-
pose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the
owner of the economic use of the property suggest [sic] that
the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to
bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a
whole."3 9
One commentator has defined a regulatory taking as that
occurring "through the impact of a governmental statute, or-
dinance or regulation," rather than the permanent physical
occupation of property. 40 The essence of a regulatory taking
claim is that some governmental regulation of property has
so invaded the right of the property owner to use or dispose of
his or her property that the regulation has effectively taken
the property, or at least an interest in the property.41
For purposes of the proposal advanced by this comment,
the term "regulatory taking" will refer to instances where
36. Id. at 435 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 44 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)). First, the
Court believed that a permanent physical occupation deprives property owners
of their right to possess the occupied space and exclude others from possessing
or using the occupied space. Id. Second, a permanent physical occupation for-
ever denies owners control of the use of the property. Id. at 436. Lastly, the
Court reasoned that while owners may still have the legal right to dispose of
their property following a permanent physical occupation, such right will be of
little value since a purchaser's rights will be just as diminished as the seller's.
Id.
37. Id. at 436. Indeed, the taking in Loretto involved only the attachment of
plates, boxes, wires, bolts and screws-to the roof and exterior wall of plaintiff's
building. Id. at 438.
38. 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
39. Yee, 503 U.S. at 523.
40. Michael M. Berger, Silence at the Court: The Curious Absence of Regu-
latory Takings Cases from California Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1993).
41. POLLOT, supra note 3, at 86. Professor Berger notes that a regulatory
taking will lie where governmental regulation of property so adversely affects
the owner's use of the property that it is "taken in the constitutional sense."
Berger, supra note 40, at 1134.
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various land use regulatory devices employed by governmen-
tal bodies are challenged, including off-site dedications,4 2
fees-in-lieu-of-dedication,43 impact fees," special assess-
ments, 45 linkages46 and set-asides. 47
B. Pre-Nollan Regulatory Takings Analysis
1. The Holmes Formula
The U.S. Supreme Court long ago recognized that non-
physical appropriations of property are subject to constitu-
tional challenge under the Takings Clause.48 In the first of
many regulatory takings cases to come, the Court announced
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon49 that a property regula-
tion will constitute a taking if it "goes too far."50 This horn-
book rule, implied by Justice Holmes, was based on the bal-
ancing of private and public interests. 51 Although, as Holmes
42. Off-site dedications require the dedication of land or construction of im-
provements outside the development itself. Been, supra note 30, at 480.
43. Here, the municipality gives the developer the option of paying a fee
instead of requiring the dedication of land and/or improvements. Id.
44. Impact fees charge developers for the costs that the municipality will
incur in providing public services to the development. Id. Impact fees can be
levied upon nearly every kind of development, in contrast to fees-in-lieu-of-dedi-
cation, which typically apply to subdivisions only. Id.
45. "[A] special assessment is a charge levied against real property... ben-
efited by a local improvement in order to pay the cost of that improvement." R.
Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Develop-
ment Exactions, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 20 (1987) (quoting Solvang Mun.
Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 395-96 (Ct. App.
1980)).
46. Linkages condition commercial or office space development on "the de-
veloper's provision of facilities or services for which the development will create
a need, or that the development will displace." Been, supra note 30, at 480.
Linkages have been used to fund "low-income housing, mass transit facilities,
day care services, and job-training and employment opportunities." Id. at 480-
81.
47. Set-asides require developers to offer low and moderate income resi-
dents a certain percentage of their units at affordable prices, or else pay in-lieu
fees to an affordable housing fund. Id. at 481.
48. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892
(1992) (referring to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15
(1922)) (explaining that meaningful enforcement of the Takings Clause places
other property regulations under constitutional limits); see also id. at 2900 n.15
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment can be read to encompass regulatory
deprivations of property).
49. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id. at 413.
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recognized, there is an implied limitation of the police power
on the enjoyment of private property rights,52 he stated that
"the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract
and due process clauses are gone."53 Unfortunately, Holmes'
pronouncement included no rules for determining just when a
regulation would constitute a taking by going too far.54
2. The Agins Two-Prong Test
Following Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme Court strug-
gled to establish guidelines for determining when a land use
regulation goes too far and becomes a taking. In a brief but
important decision, the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon55
established two broad tests for determining When a regula-
tory taking occurs. Specifically, the Agins Court held that
where an "ordinance does not substantially advance [a] legiti-
mate state interest[ ]... or denies an owner economically via-
ble use of his land," a taking will be found.56 An examination
of Supreme Court jurisprudence both before and after Agins
reveals that most takings cases can be classified into either of
these two broad categories. Since Nollan and Dolan both fall
under this substantial advancement of legitimate state inter-
ests prong, 57 this comment will first briefly examine the de-
nial of economically viable use test.
a. Denial of Economically Viable Use of Land
While the Agins Court did not specifically apply the de-
nial of economic use prong to the facts of the case,5 8 other
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. As Justice Holmes stated regarding his rule, "this is a question of de-
gree - and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). See Craig A. Peterson,
Recent Development in "Takings" Jurisprudence: Land Use Regulatory "Tak-
ings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335,
339 (1988) (noting that Holmes failed to provide guidelines for determining
when a regulation goes too far).
55. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
56. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 81, 161.
58. Since the appellants in Agins never sought approval of their develop-
ment under the zoning ordinance in question, the sole issue was whether the
enactment of a zoning ordinance was a taking, which was answered in the neg-
ative. Agins, 447 U.S. at 259-60. Although the Court recognized that the open
space ordinance did limit development of appellants' parcel, it noted that the
1996]
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recent Supreme Court cases have examined this test in
detail.
Though prior to the Agins decision, the Court in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City59 recognized
that denial of the economically viable use of one's land may
constitute a taking.6 0 Among the key factors identified by the
Penn Central Court for determining when a taking occurs are
"[t]he economic impact of the regulation" and "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations."61
In Penn Central, the owner of Grand Central Terminal
was denied permission to build a high-rise building above its
terminal, under a New York City landmark preservation
law.62 Penn Central unsuccessfully argued to the Court that
the law constituted a taking of its valuable air rights above
the terminal.63 Penn Central also argued that the law signifi-
cantly diminished the value of the terminal as a whole. 4More recently, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil,65 the Court formulated a takings rule for when all eco-
nomic use of real property has been sacrificed.66 Justice
Scalia held that where a land use regulation denies a prop-
erty owner of virtually all economic use of his or her property,
a taking occurs. The property owner in Lucas had
purchased two beachfront lots that were zoned for construc-
tion of single-family residences.6 Subsequent to the
purchase, the Coastal Council issued a regulation having the
effect of permanently banning any development of Lucas'
beachfront property. 69 Lucas alleged an uncompensated tak-
ing, contending the regulation effected a "complete extin-
guishment of his property's value."70 The Court agreed.7'
ordinance did not "prevent the best use of appellants' land" or hinder the pur-
suit of "their reasonable investment backed expectations." Id. at 262.
59. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127-28.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 116-17.
63. Id. at 130.
64. Id. at 131.
65. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
66. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-95.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2890.
69. Id. at 2889-90.
70. Id. at 2890.
71. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-02.
522 [Vol. 36
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The rationale given for the takings rule in Lucas is that
confiscatory regulations, 2 from the landowner's perspective,
are the equivalent of a physical appropriation.73 Justice
Scalia noted that confiscatory regulations carry the risk "that
private property is being pressed into some form of public ser-
vice under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."7 4
The only exception to the takings rule in Lucas applies when
a regulation essentially duplicates rights that either adjoin-
ing landowners or the state would have under its nuisance
laws in any event. v5
It is important to note that Lucas did not challenge the
ordinance as being an invalid exercise of the police power.76
Rather, he relied solely on the argument that his property's
economic value had been completely extinguished.77 This is
to be contrasted with those takings claims that allege not a
deprivation of economic use, of property, but a failure of the
land use regulation to substantially advance a legitimate
state interest.
b. Substantial Advancement of Legitimate State
Interests
The second method to establish a regulatory taking is to
prove the regulation in question fails to "substantially ad-
vance legitimate state interests."78 Previous support for this
test came from the Penn Central case, where the Court noted
that land use regulations may constitute a taking "if not rea-
sonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public
purpose .. .
Before Nollan, the Court was silent as to how Agins' sub-
stantial advancement of legitimate state interests prong
72. The Court defined confiscatory regulations as those "that prohibit all
economically beneficial use of land." Id. at 2900.
73. Id. at 2894.
74. Id. at 2895.
75. Id. at 2900-01. To illustrate, Justice Scalia gave the example of a nu-
clear power plant owner who is directed to remove the plant because it sits near
an earthquake fault. Id. at 2900-01. In such a case, the owner would not be
entitled to compensation. Id. While such a regulation might eliminate the only
economically productive use of the land, the use itself was impermissible under
state nuisance law in the first place. Id.
76. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
77. Id.
78. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
79. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
19961 523
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should be applied.8 0 However, the Court's decision in Nollan
has been interpreted, by both California courts and academ-
ics, as clarifying the substantial advancement test for estab-
lishing a regulatory taking.8 ' An examination of Nollan and
its essential nexus test follows.
C. The Nollan Decision
1. The Facts
In Nollan, the landowners leased a small beachfront
bungalow and decided to exercise their option to purchase the
property, which was conditioned on their promise to demolish
the bungalow and replace it with another structure.8 2 The
Nollans submitted a permit application to the California
Coastal Commission, proposing to replace the existing bunga-
low with a three-bedroom house.8 3 The Commission ap-
proved the permit, subject to the condition that the Nollans
grant a public easement across their property.8 4 The ease-
ment, to be bounded by the Nollans' seawall on one side and
the mean high tide line on the other, was designed to allow
public access between a county park and a public beach,
which lie north and south of the Nollans' property, respec-
tively. 5 The Nollans appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court,
alleging the access condition constituted an uncompensated
taking.8 6
Justice Scalia's majority opinion began by noting that a
taking would have undoubtedly occurred had the State of
California simply demanded a public easement across the
Nollans' property, instead of conditioning their permit upon
80. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987)
("Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what consti-
tutes a 'legitimate state interest' .... ").
81. See Blue Jeans Equities West v. City of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
114, 117 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992) ("Nollan has been con-
strued as refining the first prong of the Agins test 'to require that the regulation
advance the precise state interest which avowedly motivated it.'") (quoting
Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura, 282 Cal. Rptr. 877, 884 (Ct.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992)); see also Falik & Shimko, supra
note 9, at 379 ("Nollan gives new vitality to the other Agins prong - lack of a
legitimate state interest which is substantially advanced by the regulation at
issue.").




86. Id. at 831.
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acquiescence to the access condition.s 7 Given this, the major-
ity asked whether requiring conveyance of the easement as a
condition precedent for issuance of the development permit
changed the analysis in any way."8 The Court pointed out
that while the substantial advancement of legitimate state
interests test of Agins lacked determinative standards, "a
broad range of governmental purposes and regulations" had
satisfied the requirement in the past. 9
The Court then began its examination of the access con-
dition and the purported reasons for imposing the condition
on the Nollans. 90 The Commission argued the easement was
necessary to "protect[ ] the public's ability to see the beach,
assist[ I the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to
using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and pre-
vent[ ] congestion on the public beaches."9 ' According to Jus-
tice Scalia, these reasons alone would have been sufficient to
entitle the Commission to deny the building permit outright
if the new house substantially interfered with the purposes
given.92 The Court went on to list various development con-
ditions that would be constitutional if they in fact served the
same legitimate police power objectives that would justify a
permit denial.93
However, the Court found the specific permit require-
ment chosen by the Commission, the lateral access easement,
to be unconstitutional. 94 As its rationale, the Court noted the
"lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose
of the building restriction ....- 9 The Commission had re-
87. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
88. Id. at 834.
89. Id. at 834-35. As examples, the Court cited Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980), where a scenic zoning law was sustained. See Agins, 447
U.S. at 260-62. Also, the Court referred to Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), where the Court approved the effects a landmark
preservation law had on a high-rise development. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at
138.
90. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-39.
91. Id. at 835.
92. Id. at 835-36. Justice Scalia mentioned such a permit denial might con-
stitute a taking if it drastically interfered with the Nollans' use of their prop-
erty. Id. at 836.
93. Id. at 836. Examples of such legitimate conditions given by the Court
included height, width, or fence limitations, or even the provision of a viewing
spot on the Nollans' property. Id.
94. Id. at 838.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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quested a beachfront easement across the Nollans' property
in return for approval of a building permit.96 However, the
reasons advanced by the Commission in support of the ease-
ment97 lacked any nexus to the permit condition itself.98 The
Court explained:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement
that people already on the public beaches be able to walk
across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also im-
possible to understand how it lowers any "psychological
barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to
remedy any additional congestion on them caused by con-
struction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find
that the Commission's imposition of the permit condition
cannot be treated as an exercise of its land-use power for
any of these purposes. 99
2. The Essential Nexus Test
For a land use regulation to be constitutionally valid,
Nollan requires an essential nexus between the regulation
and the purported reasons for the regulation, the purposes
themselves being sufficient to deny issuance of the permit. 10 0
Where there is no essential nexus between the regulation and
the reasons advanced therefor, an inference is created that
the governmental body is trying to obtain an interest in prop-
erty without paying for it. 10 1 The Court concluded that if the
Commission wanted an easement across the Nollans' prop-
96. Id. at 827-28.
97. Id. at 834.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. Justice Brennan's dissent criticized the essen-
tial nexus test as "demand[ing] a degree of exactitude that is inconsistent with
our standard for reviewing the rationality of a State's exercise of its police
power...." Id. at 842-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 837 ("[Tlhe lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other
than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an
easement... without payment of compensation.") (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v.
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981), overruled by Auburn v. McEvoy, 553
A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988)). Id. See also Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 375 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The [Nollan] [Clourt held
there must be a substantial connection, or 'nexus' between the public burden
created by the construction and the necessity for the easement. Without such a
connection, there is an inference the government is simply trying to expropriate
property without paying for it.").
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erty, the Fifth Amendment required just compensation to be
paid to the Nollans for their loss of property. 10 2
D. Interpreting Nollan
Following Nollan, California appellate courts and the
Ninth Circuit took a decidedly restrictive approach to the es-
sential nexus test, applying it only to claims of possessory
takings. 10 3 Following is a brief examination of these cases.
1. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted
the essential nexus test in Commercial Builders v. City of
Sacramento.10 4 In that case, the City of Sacramento passed
an ordinance conditioning the issuance of permits for job cre-
ating nonresidential developments on the payment of a low-
income housing fee.' 0 5 The fee was justified by city-wide find-
ings, based on a consulting firm study of the need for low-
income housing, that nonresidential development attracts
new employees to Sacramento, creating a demand for more
housing in the city. 10 6 The fees were paid pursuant to a
formula and then deposited into a housing trust fund to help
finance low-income housing. 10 7 Commercial Builders chal-
lenged the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking under the
Fifth Amendment. 08
Commercial Builders argued that while the ordinance
addressed a legitimate interest of the city, the means used
were impermissible. 10 9 They felt the burden for funding low-
income housing had been placed on nonresidential developers
without enough evidence of proportionality between the fee
charged and the developers' contribution to the low-income
housing problem. n °
The Ninth Circuit sustained the ordinance, pointing to
the consulting firm study and concluding that the burden
102. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842.
103. See infra part II.D.
104. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).





110. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 873.
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placed on the developers bore "a rational relationship to a
public cost closely associated with [the] development.""'
Alternatively, Commercial Builders asserted the essen-
tial nexus test of Nollan mandated heightened scrutiny of de-
velopment conditions, pointing out that the Court there held
"such conditions must not only be ones that the government
might 'rationally have decided' to employ for a given legiti-
mate public purpose; they must also substantially advance
such a purpose."" 2 The Ninth Circuit rejected this notion,
stating that Nollan had not "chang[ed] the level of scrutiny to
be applied to regulations that do not constitute a physical en-
croachment on land." 13
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Beezer argued the ordinance
had "little or no causal connection to [the] development."" 14
Further, he criticized the consulting firm study as "demon-
strat[ing] at best a tenuous and theoretical connection be-
tween commercial development and housing needs."" 5
Judge Beezer characterized the ordinance's fee system as
"transfer payments" exercised under the taxing power but
cloaked as an exercise of the city's police power, all at a time
of mounting budget deficits.1 1 6
2. The California Approach
California appellate courts have also limited the scope of
Nollan's essential nexus test to possessory, not regulatory
takings. In Blue Jeans Equities West v. City of San Fran-
cisco,1" 7 an office, retail, and condominium developer submit-
ted a permit, which was approved subject to the payment of a
transit impact development fee." 8 The issue before the court
111. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
112. Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 &
n.3 (1987)). Commercial Builders argued that unlike the rational relationship
test, the essential nexus test would operate to invalidate the ordinance. Id.
Specifically, Commercial Builders claimed the low-income housing fee could
only be found constitutional if their development was shown to be responsible
for an increase in need for low-income housing. Id. As will be shown, Commer-
cial Builders' objection would have been more fitting to the rough proportional-
ity analysis of Dolan. See infra text accompanying note 301.
113. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.
114. Id. at 877 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Beezer, J., dissenting).
117. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
118. Blue Jeans Equities West, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115-16. The fee was man-
dated by local ordinance and provided that developers of new downtown build-
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of appeal, answered in the negative, was whether the essen-
tial nexus test of Nollan applied to the transit impact fee." 9
In its holding, the Blue Jeans court wrote "that any
heightened scrutiny test contained in Nollan is limited to
possessory rather than regulatory takings cases. " 12 0 The
court based this result on the following language in Nollan:
[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgment of prop-
erty rights through the police power as a "substantial ad-
vanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined
to be particularly careful about the adjective where the
actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land-use restriction, since in that context there
is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-
power objective. 121
From this text, the court of appeal was sympathetic to
the interpretation that "the Nollan strict scrutiny approach is
limited to unconstitutional conditions and possessory takings
cases."
122
Several other California appellate court cases follow the
distinction between possessory and regulatory takings and
the applicability of the essential nexus test. 123
ings pay up to five dollars per square foot of new office space in order to receive
a certificate of completion and occupancy. Id. at 116. Blue Jeans Equities West
was required to pay $3.1 million for its transit impact development fee. Id.
119. Id. at 115.
120. Id. at 118.
121. Id. at 117-18 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 841 (1987)).
122. Id. at 118.
123. See Saad v. City of Berkeley, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1994)
("Both California and federal courts have rejected attempts to stretch Nollan
beyond 'possessory takings' to encompass 'regulatory takings.' "); see also City of
San Francisco v. Golden Gate Heights Invs., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 469 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 338 (1993). Golden Gate Heights was an eminent
domain action in which the landowner's vacant, hillside property was valued on
the premise that the city could have required the owner to dedicate nine out of
fourteen lots for open space. Id. at 468. The landowner argued that the essen-
tial nexus test would have required the city to pay just compensation for the
nine dedicated lots. Id. at 469. The Golden Gate Heights court held Nollan
would not have applied, as that case dealt with the physical occupation of land,
not the denial of a fourteen lot subdivision application. Id. at 469-70.
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E. The California and Ninth Circuit Regulatory Takings
Standard
Since California courts and the Ninth Circuit have ap-
plied Nollan's essential nexus test to possessory takings
claims only, what standard have they put forth for claims of
regulatory takings? The next section examines this question.
1. California's Regulatory Takings Standard
a. In General
California courts recognize that when a landowner al-
leges a possessory taking, Nollan's essential nexus test ap-
plies.124 However, where a regulatory taking is asserted,
"California courts have continued to apply a looser version of
the reasonable relationship nexus test .... 125 The constitu-
tionality of land use regulations in California via the reason-
able relationship test was established in the landmark case of
Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek.126 In that case, the California Supreme
Court upheld a statute giving cities and counties the power to
condition subdivision approvals on the dedication of land or
payment of in-lieu fees for parks or recreational purposes. 127
Associated Home Builders argued the statute could be
constitutionally applied only if "the need for additional park
and recreational facilities [was] attributable to the increase
in population stimulated by the new subdivision alone
"128
The California Supreme Court rejected this challenge,
stating the amount of land or fees required need only bear a
reasonable relationship to the use of park and recreational
facilities by future subdivision residents. 129 In so holding,
the California Supreme Court relied on an earlier exaction
decision1 3 0 which allowed future public needs and potential
population factors, rather than actual development created
124. E.g., Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr.
371, 373 (Ct. App. 1991).
125. Cassidy et al., supra note 27, at 4.
126. 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
127. Associated Home Builders, 484 P.2d at 608-10.
128. Id. at 610.
129. Id. at 612.
130. Ayres v. City of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949).
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impacts, to be used in formulating development conditions.13 1
The Associated Home Builders court noted it would have up-
held the statute, regardless of previous case law, "on the ba-
sis of a general public need for recreational facilities caused
by present and future subdivisions."'3 2 Based on this lan-
guage, the Associated Home Builders reasonable relationship
test has been interpreted as requiring "only an indirect rela-
tionship" between development exactions and the "need to
which the project contributes."3 3
The use of California's reasonable relationship test was
aptly demonstrated in Grupe v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.13 4 In that case, the plaintiff challenged a requirement
that a landowner dedicate a beachfront access easement as a
condition to a development permit.13 5 Relying on the princi-
ples announced in Associated Home Builders that only an in-
direct relationship need exist between exaction and develop-
ment burden, the Grupe court upheld the condition..3 6 The
extent of "indirectness" allowable under the reasonable rela-
tionship test is apparent given the court of appeals' acknowl-
edgement that the landowner's development project, stand-
ing alone, "[did] not create[ I the need for access.
The most recent use of California's reasonable relation-
ship test for determining regulatory takings claims was in
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.'38 There, a developer chal-
lenged a $280,000 recreation mitigation fee and a $33,220 in-
lieu art fee, both conditions precedent to approval of a devel-
131. Associated Home Builders, 484 P.2d at 610 (emphasis added).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587 (Ct. App.
1985). See Cassidy et al., supra note 27, at 4 ("[The project need not be solely
responsible for creating the impact and the condition may remedy more than
the project's share of the burdens.").
134. Grupe, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
135. Id. at 581.
136. Id. at 589.
137. Id. at 590.
138. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted and vacated, 114 S.
Ct. 2731 (1994). The day after issuing its Dolan decision, the Court reversed
and remanded Ehrlich to be reheard in light of Dolan. See Paul D. Kamenar,
Nollan, Dolan and Beyond, RECORDER, Sept. 15, 1994, at 7.
The remanded version of Ehrlich was decided on December 23, 1994, but
the decision was not published. On March 16, 1995, the California Supreme
Court granted review of the case. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, No. 93-842,
1995 Cal. LEXIS 1959. A decision is pending as of this writing.
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opment project.13 9 The court of appeal upheld the develop-
ment conditions, refusing to apply the essential nexus test of
Nollan and relying instead on the reasonable relationship
test.
140
b. Limiting the Broad Scope of California's
Regulatory Takings Standard
The main limitation on the reasonable relationship test
for assessing regulatory takings claims is where no such rela-
tionship exists at all. For example, one court struck down a
condition to a building permit requiring the landowners to
dedicate fourteen percent of their property to correct the
alignment of a street. 14 1 In that case, it was held that no
nexus existed at all between the dedication condition and the
purported traffic burden created by the development, point-
ing to an environmental impact report that concluded the
landowner's development would not create "significant traffic
problems in the area."'42
Additionally, Government Code section 66001141 oper-
ates to limit the ability of governmental entities to impose
exactions as conditions to approval of development projects.
As will be shown, while this statute appears to codify the
holdings of Nollan and Dolan, in practice it only marginally
139. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470.
140. Id. at 476, 482.
141. Rohn v. City of Visalia, 263 Cal. Rptr. 319, 320 (Ct. App. 1989).
142. Id. at 328. A similar result was reached in Liberty v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Ct. App. 1980), where a permit condition requiring
the developer to record a deed restriction to provide free public parking until
5:00 p.m. every day for thirty years was invalidated. Id. at 249-50. The Liberty
court reasoned:
Where the conditions imposed are not related to the use being made of
the property but are imposed because the entity conceives a means of
shifting the burden of providing the cost of a public benefit to another
not responsible for or only remotely or speculatively benefiting from it,
there is an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Id. at 254 (citations omitted).
143. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66001 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995). Government Code
§ 66001(a) requires the governmental entity to determine how a reasonable re-
lationship exists between the use of a development fee or need for a particular
public facility and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.
Government Code § 66001(b) mandates that local agencies determine how a
reasonable relationship exists between the amount of the fee and the cost of the
public facility, or portion thereof attributable to the development paying the fee.
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expands the duties imposed on municipalities in issuing
exactions.144
2. The Ninth Circuit Regulatory Takings Standard
The reasonable relationship test is also followed by the
Ninth Circuit in assessing regulatory takings claims. In
Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento,145 a housing fee
ordinance was sustained because it was "sufficiently related
to the legitimate purpose it [sought] to achieve."146 According
to the Ninth Circuit, a permit condition will constitute a tak-
ing only "where the condition lack[s] any rational relation-
ship to the project for which the permit was sought."147
Given the narrow interpretations of Nollan and the judi-
cial deference given nonpossessory land use regulations, the
question becomes whether California courts and the Ninth
Circuit will continue the possessory-regulatory takings di-
chotomy in interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court's latest tak-
ings decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard.14s
F. The Dolan Decision
Dolan addressed the question left open by Nollan, that
once an essential nexus has been established between devel-
opment conditions and the purported reasons for the condi-
tions, "what is the required degree of connection between the
exactions imposed ... and the projected impacts of the pro-
posed development[?]" 149 In other words, has the land use
regulation gone too far by requiring some interest in land or
the payment of a fee that is not in rough proportion to the
burden the development has on the community.
1. The Facts
Florence Dolan, the owner of a plumbing and electric
supply business, applied to the City of Tigard for a redevelop-
144. See infra text accompanying notes 254-61.
145. 941 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
146. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 873. According to the Commercial
Builders court, "purely financial exaction[s]" are not takings if they are
designed to pay a "social cost that is reasonably related to the activity against
which the fee is assessed." Id. at 876.
147. Id. at 873 (emphasis added).
148. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
149. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2312.
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ment permit, proposing to significantly expand the size of her
store and pave the parking lot. 150
Pursuant to Oregon state law, the City of Tigard had en-
acted a Community Development Code (CDC), containing
comprehensive statewide land use planning criteria. 151
Tigard's CDC required property owners in the Central Busi-
ness District to leave fifteen percent of their property as open
space.1 5 2 Additionally, the CDC required new developments
to dedicate land for bicycle/pedestrian pathways.1 5 3 Finally,
Tigard adopted a master drainage plan that suggested vari-
ous flood prevention and mitigation improvements to Fanno
Creek, which flows through the southwest corner of Dolan's
property.1 54
With these regulations in mind, Tigard granted Dolan's
permit application, subject to two conditions.155 First, the
city required Mrs. Dolan to dedicate all her property lying
within the 100-year Fanno Creek floodplain as a public
greenway, amounting to ten percent of her property.156 Sec-
ond, Dolan was required to dedicate an additional fifteen foot
strip of land next to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle
path. 1 57 The dedications could be used by Dolan to satisfy the
open space requirement.'
The development conditions were sustained by the city,
the Land Use Board of Appeals, the Oregon Court of Appeals,
and the Oregon Supreme Court, on the basis that a reason-
able relationship existed between the dedications and the im-
pact of the proposed development.159
As it did in Nollan, the Court first recognized that had
Tigard simply required the dedications outside of the permit
approval context, a taking would have occurred.160 Moreover,
the Court stated that the development conditions had not de-
prived Dolan of viable economic use of her property, putting




154. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
155. Id. at 2314.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2314.
159. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
160. Id. at 2316.
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the case squarely within Agins' substantial advancement of
legitimate state interests prong.
161
The Court began its analysis by determining whether
Tigard's development conditions satisfied the essential nexus
test. 162 As to the greenway, the Court found a nexus, noting
the city wanted to limit development within the Fanno Creek
area to prevent flooding. 163 In this case, paving the parking
lot would increase stormwater run-off into the creek.' 6 4 Like-
wise, a nexus was found between reducing traffic congestion
and providing a bicycle/pedestrian pathway.'65
2. The Rough Proportionality Test
This brought the Court to its second consideration,
"whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's
permit conditions [bore] the required relationship to the pro-
jected impact of petitioner's proposed development."' 66 In its
search to formulate an appropriate rule, the Court turned to
the wealth of state court decisions on the matter.
67
The Court rejected as too permissive the standard fol-
lowed by some states requiring only general formulations "as
to the necessary connection between the required dedication
and the proposed development." 68 Chief Justice Rehnquist
feared such an easily met standard would fail to protect the
right of property owners to receive just compensation if their
property was taken for public use.' 69
Similarly, the Court rejected as too exacting the specific
and uniquely attributable test, which requires direct propor-
tionality between the land use regulation and the need for
such regulation. 170
161. Id. at 2316 n.6.
162. Id. at 2317.
163. Id. at 2318.
164. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2318-19.
168. Id. at 2318.
169. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
170. Id. According to the Court, in those states following the specific and
uniquely attributable test, if the governmental entity cannot show direct pro-
portionality between the exaction and the specifically created need, there is a
confiscation of private property under the guise of the police power. Id. The
Court felt the Constitution did not require such high scrutiny, considering the
interests involved. Id.
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The Dolan Court chose to adopt the intermediate posi-
tion, known as the reasonable relationship test, as the consti-
tutional standard for takings analysis. 7 ' This test attempts
to distinguish between proper police power regulations and
improper uses of the eminent domain power. 172 It does so by
asking whether some reasonable relationship exists between
the regulations and the proposed property use, as opposed to
regulations which serve as an excuse to take private property
simply because the landowner is seeking a license or
permit. 173
However, the Court was concerned with confusing its
new standard with the rational basis test used for Equal Pro-
tection Clause claims, "which describes the minimal level of
scrutiny.' 74 Therefore, the Dolan majority adopted the term
rough proportionality as "best encapsulat[ing] what we hold
to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 7 ' Applying
the rough proportionality test to the facts, the Court found
both of the City of Tigard's developmerit conditions
unconstitutional. 176
As to the greenway, the Court agreed that limiting flood-
plain development by Mrs. Dolan would reduce the possibility
of Fanno Creek overflowing. 177 However, the Dolan majority
felt the greenway condition went too far, because it not only
prevented floodplain development but also required dedica-
tion of Dolan's property to the city. 1 78 Dedicating the prop-
erty, the Court pointed out, would eviscerate Dolan's right to
exclude others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property."'79
171. Id. ("We think the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority
of the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of
those previously discussed.").
172. Id. (quoting Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)).
173. Id. at 2319 (quoting Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301
(Neb. 1980)).
174. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court's desire to avoid applying minimal
constitutional scrutiny to takings claims is congruent with Justice Scalia's
statement in Nollan, that the standards for due process or equal protection
claims are "quite different" from the takings requirement that the regulation
substantially advance legitimate state interests. Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.3 (1987).
175. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
176. Id. at 2320-22.
177. Id. at 2320.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
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With this in mind, the Court failed to see how flood control
was improved through a public, nondeveloped greenway ver-
sus a private one. 18
0
Similarly, the Court found no rough proportionality be-
tween the pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement and the bur-
den on traffic congestion created by the development.18" '
While the Court recognized that Dolan's new store would in-
crease traffic in downtown Tigard,18 2 it would not allow the
pathway easement to be enforced based solely on the "con-
clusory statement that [the bicycle/pedestrian pathway]
could offset some of the traffic demand."8 3
3. Shifting Burdens and Individualized
Determinations
In what may become the most critical part of the opinion,
the Dolan Court decided to place the burden of demonstrat-
ing rough proportionality on the city.18 4 The Court stated,
"[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and ex-
tent to the impact of the proposed development."' 8 5 The
Court justified this departure from traditional land use regu-
latory challenges in that in Dolan, "the city made an adjudi-
cative decision to condition petitioner's application for a
building permit on an individual parcel. In this situation, the
burden properly rests on the city."1 86
Thus, with respect to the greenway, the Court held the
city had failed to make any individual determination as to
why a public, rather than private, floodplain easement was
necessary to prevent flooding.' 87 Likewise, the Court felt the
180. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
181. Id. at 2321-22.
182. Id. at 2321. The city estimated Dolan's expanded store would create
435 additional trips per day. Id.
183. Id. at 2322 (emphasis added). The Court noted that Tigard's finding
that the pathway could offset some traffic demand is very different from a find-
ing that the pathway would, or would be likely to, offset traffic demand. Id.
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, J.,
dissenting)).
184. Id.
185. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
186. Id. at 2320 n.8.
187. Id. at 2320-21.
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city needed to "quantify its findings" to support the dedica-
tion of a pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. 188
III. THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED
Since Nollan v. California Coastal Commission"9 has
been limited to claims of possessory takings by California
courts and the Ninth Circuit, 190 the arrival of Dolan v. City of
Tigard'91 has left California's land use community wondering
how the rough proportionality standard will be interpreted.
This comment examines whether the possessory-regula-
tory distinction in takings claims should be continued in the
judicial explications of Dolan that are sure to come. At the
heart of this question is the validity of the narrow approach
taken toward the Court's essential nexus test, and the advis-
ability of continued use of the California-Ninth Circuit regu-
latory takings standard, given the language and rationales
behind recent U.S. Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, in-
cluding its most recent decision in Dolan.
IV. ANALYSIS
Clearly, the land use regulations in Nollan and Dolan
both involved physical dedications of land.192 How then is it
possible to advance the proposition that the Nollan-Dolan
takings standards should apply to nonpossessory takings
claims? This section examines the validity of the possessory-
regulatory analysis adhered to by California appellate courts
and the Ninth Circuit, paying close attention to what Dolan
appears to say about this distinction. This comment then ex-
amines the possessory-regulatory division in light of the ra-
tionales behind recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence.
A. Nollan and Dolan as a Dual Takings Standard
As a preliminary matter, it is appropriate to briefly con-
sider whether the essential nexus standard of Nollan and
rough proportionality test of Dolan should be considered to-
gether in analyzing takings claims. There is evidence to sug-
gest these two tests operate together as a functioning unit.
188. Id. at 2322.
189. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
190. See supra part II.D.
191. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2309.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85, 155-58.
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In its holding in Dolan, the Court stated that the City of
Tigard would have to make an "individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and ex-
tent to the impact of the proposed development." 193 At least
one commentator has interpreted this language as referring
to both the essential nexus and rough proportionality
standards. 194
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the Dolan
Court first applied the essential nexus test to the facts of the
case, 195 rather than simply announcing its new rough propor-
tionality standard and applying it. This seems to lend itself
to the interpretation that the Nollan-Dolan analyses should
be considered together in evaluating takings claims.
B. Misinterpretations of Nollan
California appellate courts have based their refusal to
apply the essential nexus test to regulatory takings claims on
specific language in Nollan that apparently makes the pos-
sessory-regulatory distinction itself.196 After noting that suc-
cessful police power regulations of property require a sub-
stantial advancement of a legitimate state interest, Justice
Scalia, in Nollan, indicated the Court would be "particularly
careful" when the requirement to satisfying a land use regu-
lation involves the conveyance of real property. 197 According
to the Court, such a condition entails the "heightened risk
that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation require-
ment, rather than the stated police-power objective." 198
Based on this language, it is difficult to comprehend how
the essential nexus test is limited solely to possessory takings
claims. It would appear the Court is making a simple state-
ment that where dedications of property are at stake, proof of
a substantially advanced state interest requires especially
careful analysis of the essential nexus. The language of Nol-
lan simply does not support the notion that regulatory tak-
193. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (emphasis added).
194. E.g., Kamenar, supra note 138, at 7. "[T]he exactions must be 'related
both in nature [under Nollan's 'essential nexus' test] and extent [under Dolan's
'rough proportionality' test] to the impact of the proposed project' rather than
based on generalized findings .... " Id.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
197. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
198. Id.
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ings claims require no essential nexus analysis at all, as the
California and Ninth Circuit approach would suggest.
California's possessory-regulatory takings distinction is
further based on the misconceived notion that "most legal
scholars have concluded the Nollan strict scrutiny approach
is limited to ... possessory takings cases."19 9 California ap-
pellate courts apparently missed the scholarly commentary
following Nollan, indicating that the essential nexus test ap-
plies to all regulations of property, not just those involving
physical deprivations.2 °0 Indeed, one commentator has sug-
gested that the essential nexus requirement applies to such
nonpossessory land use regulations as in-lieu fees, "traffic
mitigation fees, provision of day-care services by developers
of office space and requirements that commercial developers
contribute toward affordable housing development funds."2 °1
Furthermore, there is alternative case law suggesting
that the essential nexus test applies to all government condi-
tions on property use. Following Nollan, the New York Court
of Appeals invalidated as an unconstitutional taking a New
York City ordinance aimed at preventing homelessness.
20 2
The ordinance prohibited owners of single-room occupancy
(SRO) properties from demolishing, altering, or converting
such properties. 20 3 Also, the owners of such properties were
mandated to restore all units to a habitable condition and
rent them at controlled rates for an unspecified period.20 4
199. Blue Jeans Equities West v. City of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114,
118 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). Interestingly, one of two legal scholars
cited by the Blue Jeans court in support of its position stated only that "per-
haps" Nollan's essential nexus test is limited to possessory takings. Manheim,
supra note 32, at 950. The other commentator acknowledged that one possible
application of the essential nexus test would be to strike down "linkage or im-
pact fee requirement[s] imposed on commercial developers," which are clearly
nonpossessory land use regulations. Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives
and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 12
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 231, 262-63 (1988).
200. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, 101 HARv. L. REV.
10, 247 (1987). The Court's decision in Nollan "indicates that all regulations
will now be subjected to a level of scrutiny far higher than the Court previously
has used in assessing claims of regulatory takings." Id. (emphasis added). "The
Court thus articulated a standard of heightened scrutiny for regulations chal-
lenged under the takings clause." Id. at 249.
201. Falik & Shimko, supra note 9, at 392-93.
202. See Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
203. Id. at 1060.
204. Id. at 1060-61.
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While the end of preventing homelessness was found to
be well within the city's police power, 20 5 the Court invali-
dated the means employed, as there was no constitutionally
sufficient nexus between the development ban and the home-
less problem.20 6
Lastly, the language from at least one California appel-
late case indicates that it is conditions on land use in general,
not just those involving possessory exactions, that invoke the
essential nexus test.20 7 In that case, the appellate court read
Nollan as requiring "a substantial relationship between the
public burden posed by proposed construction and conditions
imposed by the government to permit that construction."20 8
This reference to government conditions in general, without
differentiating between possessory and regulatory conditions,
seems to imply the applicability of Nollan to both types of
exactions.
C. Dolan's Disapproval of the Possessory-Regulatory
Distinction
While the Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard20 9 did not go
beyond its decision to specifically address whether the rough
proportionality standard should be limited to possessory tak-
ings claims only, there are reasons to suggest that the Court
would have its new standard apply to all takings claims.210
1. Conditions in General
First, specific language in the opinion suggests it is land
use conditions in general, not just physical exactions, that in-
voke the rough proportionality standard.2 1
205. Id. at 1071.
206. Id. at 1068. While the city claimed that preventing homelessness was
the purpose of the law, one of the city's own studies acknowledged that the SRO
conversion ban "would do little to resolve the homeless crisis." Id. The court of
appeals therefore concluded that the essential nexus between the conversion
ban and the homeless problem was "indirect at best and conjectural." Id. at
1069.
207. Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371
(Ct. App. 1991).
208. Id. at 376 (emphasis added). Later in the case, the appellate court
again stated that "Nollan requires a 'close connection' between the burden and
the condition." Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
209. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
210. See Berwanger et al., supra note 27, at 249.
211. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320 n.8.
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The Dolan majority, in defending its decision to place the
burden on the city to justify the required exactions, noted
that "the city made an adjudicative decision to condition peti-
tioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel."2 12 The failure of the Court to delineate between pos-
sessory and regulatory conditions has led one observer to con-
clude that Dolan's rough proportionality standard applies to
"'conditions' in general, not just those conditions that are
limited to the exacting of a possessory interest."
213
This reading of Dolan is further supported by the fact
that the Court was well aware, through amicus briefs, of the
cases limiting Nollan to possessory takings claims.21 4 The
Court had ample opportunity to join the possessory-regula-
tory distinction fray, but chose not to.
Adherents to the possessory-regulatory takings dichot-
omy may attempt to find solace in particular portions of the
Dolan opinion that on the surface may appear to validate the
limited approach taken by the Ninth Circuit and California's
appellate courts. Most notable is the Court's remark that
"the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the
use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a require-
ment that she deed portions of the property to the city."
21 5
However, as one commentator has suggested:
The significance ... of that discussion appears not to be
an adoption of the distinction by the Ninth Circuit and the
California courts of appeal between regulatory and pos-
sessory takings; rather, the discussion raises the issue
that the city failed to justify on an individualized basis,
the requirement that Mrs. Dolan dedicate a fee interest
instead of some lesser interest that would serve the same
public purpose without depriving her of the right to
exclude. 216
212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. E.g., Berwanger et al., supra note 27, at 250.
214. See Brief for the Georgia Public Policy Foundation and Southeastern
Legal Foundation, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518),
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File. ("Since the Nollan ruling, courts have been
split as to its implications. Some courts have either ignored Nollan or reduced
its application to physical takings, thus holding Nollan inapplicable to cases
involving regulatory takings."); see also Brief for National Association of Home
Builders et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518),
LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File.
215. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
216. Berwanger et al., supra note 27, at 250.
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Thus, while the Dolan Court did not explicitly disapprove
of the possessory-regulatory takings distinction, such a con-
clusion may be inferred from the language of the opinion
itself.
2. Remanding Ehrlich v. City of Culver City
Subsequent procedural action taken by the Supreme
Court also indicates a proclivity on the part of the Court to
apply the Dolan analysis to regulatory takings claims.
A day after issuing its decision in Dolan, the Court re-
versed and remanded Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,217 to be
decided in light of Dolan.21 s Ehrlich dealt with a regulatory
takings challenge,219 a fact of which presumably the Court
was well aware. The very act of granting certiorari, revers-
ing, and remanding such a case to be decided in light of Do-
lan, seems to indicate a willingness on the part of the Court
to apply the rough proportionality standard to regulatory, as
well as possessory takings challenges.22 °
D. A Higher Standard of Review for Takings
The California-Ninth Circuit reasonable relationship ap-
proach to regulatory takings121 is also constitutionally sus-
pect, given the fact that Supreme Court takings jurispru-
dence has evidenced a higher standard of review for takings
claims than for other constitutionally based challenges.2 22
In Nollan, Justice Scalia took to task Justice Brennan's
claim that the Court was changing the standard of review for
police power regulations.223 Justice Scalia stated:
[Olur opinions do not establish that these standards are
the same as those applied to due process or equal protec-
tion claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in
the takings field have generally been quite different. We
have required that the regulation "substantially advance"
217. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted and vacated, 114 S.
Ct. 2731 (1994).
218. See supra note 138.
219. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470. See supra text accompanying note 139.
220. See Berwanger et al., supra note 27, at 250. 'The Dolan majority's dis-
position of the Ehrlich decision leads to the conclusion that regulatory takings
cases also require heightened scrutiny." Id.
221. See supra part II.E.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-35.
223. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843 (1987).
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the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved...
not that "the State 'could rationally have decided' that the
measure adopted might achieve the State's objective. .. ."
[T]here is no reason to believe (and the language of our
cases gives some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the
regulation of property is at issue the standards for takings
challenges, due process challenges, and equal protections
challenges are identical ... 224
The Court's command that takings claims require a
higher standard of review goes back to Penn Central, where
the Court noted that land use restrictions "may constitute a
'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose .... 225 The idea that a land use
regulation must substantially advance state interests in or-
der to avoid the payment of just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment is evidenced in many recent takings opin-
ions by the Court.226
Thus, in order to assure that a land use regulation sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state interest, the Court de-
mands that a higher standard of review, namely the essential
nexus and rough proportionality tests, be used when a land-
owner asserts a taking.227 Most importantly, when describ-
ing the heightened scrutiny that will be used to evaluate tak-
ings claims, Justice Scalia in Nollan declined to differentiate
between possessory and regulatory takings.228  Arguably
then, this high standard of review mandated by Nollan ap-
plies to all takings claims, not just those involving a physical
dedication of land.
Notwithstanding those cases limiting Nollan to posses-
sory takings,229 at least one California court has recognized
the heightened scrutiny that the Fifth Amendment de-
mands.23 0 This opinion also declined to adopt the possessory-
224. Id. at 836 n.3 (citations omitted).
225. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
226. $ee Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992); Yee v. City of Escon-
dido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
227. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
228. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 n.3.
229. See supra part II.D.
230. See Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr.
371, 377 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Nollan ... changed the standard of constitutional
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regulatory distinction when describing the heightened scru-
tiny to be used in evaluating takings claims.231
Commentary following Nollan also indicates that the
reasonable relationship test is inappropriate when evaluat-
ing takings claims.232
Seemingly, what California courts and the Ninth Circuit
have created is a two-tier system of justice for takings claims.
While possessory takings claims have received the height-
ened standard of review mandated by Nollan233 (and perhaps
in the future by Dolan), regulatory takings are judged accord-
ing to the easily satisfied reasonable relationship test.23 4
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has implicitly indicated that
all takings claims are subject to heightened scrutiny.235
Thus, continued adherence by California courts and the
Ninth Circuit to what is essentially a due process standard of
review in regulatory takings cases is constitutionally
unwarranted.
E. The Public Should Pay
Finally, the fundamental notion that public burdens
should be funded by public, rather than private, funds under-
cuts the continued validity of using the rational relationship
test to evaluate regulatory takings claims.236
1. The Purpose of the Fifth Amendment
The overall purpose of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause was eloquently described by the Court in Armstrong v.
review in takings cases. Whether the new standard be described as 'substantial
relationship,' or 'heightened scrutiny,' it is clear the rational basis test... no
longer controls.").
231. Id.
232. See Berwanger et al., supra note 27, at 248 (explaining Nollan's holding
as requiring heightened judicial review for takings challenges); Falik &
Shimko, supra note 9, at 390 ("[Tlhe scrutiny the Court will utilize in reviewing
land-use decisions is more than the traditional, rational basis approach .... );
Peterson, supra note 54, at 338 ("[T]o pass muster under the just compensation
clause, an enactment must bear a substantial relationship to a valid public pur-
pose, not merely a rational relationship, the common standard in due process
and equal protection challenges.").
233. See Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr.
371 (Ct. App. 1991).
234. See discussion supra part II.D-E.
235. See discussion supra part 1V.B-D.
236. See discussion infra part IV.E.1-4.
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United States.237 "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that
private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."238
This important rationale behind the Takings Clause has
often been repeated by the Court.2 9 However, some com-
mentators now argue that the burden of funding public needs
is increasingly being shoved unfairly onto the development
community. 4 °
Take, for example, the low-income housing fee in Com-
mercial Builders v. City of Sacramento.241 There, the city
failed to make any individual findings as to how the proposed
development would exacerbate, if at all, the low-income hous-
ing shortage.242 Rather, application of the ordinance was
based on broad, city-wide findings that nonresidential devel-
opments create a need for more low-income housing.243
Similarly, in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City,244 the city im-
posed a $33,220 in-lieu art fee, based on an ordinance which
made only a surface-level inquiry into the extent to which the
specific project would impact the arts in Culver City.245
237. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
238. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
239. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994); Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1,
9 (1988); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 n.4 (1987);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318-19 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); see also San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
240. See infra note 264.
241. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
242. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 873. See infra note 301, explaining
why the low-income housing fee would be found unconstitutional under the in-
dividualized, rough proportionality analysis mandated by Dolan.
243. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 873.
244. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted and vacated, 114 S.
Ct. 2731 (1994).
245. The Art in Public Places Program was based on the following findings:
(c) As development and revitalization of the real property within the
city continues, the opportunity for creation of cultural and artistic re-
sources is diminished. (d) As this development and revitalization con-
tinues as a result of market forces, urbanization of the community re-
sults. (e) As these opportunities are diminished and this urbanization
occurs, the need to develop alternative sources for cultural and artistic
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These cases represent an increasing use of the permit
power to extract money from private individuals for general
public purposes. Not only is this fundamentally unfair, it is
unconstitutional under modern takings jurisprudence.246 Ap-
plication of the Nollan-Dolan analysis to all takings claims
will force governmental entities to pay for, through general
funds, the needs of the public that are not legitimately cre-
ated by the development. As Judge Beezer noted in his Com-
mercial Builders dissent:
The traditional manner in which American government
has met the problem of those who cannot pay reasonable
prices for privately sold necessities - a problem caused
by society at large - has been the distribution to such
persons of funds raised from the public at large through
taxes, either in cash (welfare payments) or in goods (pub-
lic housing, publicly subsidized housing, and food stamps).
Unless we are to abandon the guiding principle of the
Takings Clause that "public burdens.., should be borne
by the public as a whole," this is the only manner that our
Constitution permits.247
2. The Danger of Using the Reasonable Relationship
Test in Analyzing Regulatory Takings Claims
Long ago in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,248 Justice
Holmes issued a rather ominous warning about the qualified
right under which private property is enjoyed.249 Explaining
that the protections of the Fifth Amendment were qualified
by the police power, Holmes remarked that "the natural ten-
dency of human nature is to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappears. "25 While
Holmes' premonition may be a bit extreme, the type of land
outlets to improve the environment, image and character of the com-
munity is increased. (f) Development of cultural and artistic assets
should be financed by those whose development and revitalization di-
minishes the availability of the community's resources for those oppor-
tunities and contributes to community urbanization.
Id. at 480. See infra note 301, explaining why the in-lieu art fee would be found
unconstitutional under the individualized, rough proportionality analysis man-
dated by Dolan.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 236-38.
247. Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th
Cir. 1991) (Beezer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
248. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
249. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
250. Id.
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use regulations that regulatory takings challenges encom-
pass do pose a serious threat to private property rights. One
commentator has identified two specific dangers posed by
land use exactions.25 '
[E]xactions allow municipalities to redistribute wealth by
charging the developer more than the costs of the harm
that the development is causing, and transferring that
overcharge to others; and exactions may encourage the
government to overregulate in order to give itself a way of
raising money or other benefits. The dangers are related,
in the sense that overregulation is nothing more than
charging a price for what should be free, and thereby re-
distributing wealth.252
Another danger associated with continued adherence to
the reasonable relationship test is the possibility of munici-
palities exacting large development fees in order to condemn
and purchase the property in question via eminent
domain.253
Some observers might be led to believe that these con-
cerns are overstated, given the language of Government Code
section 66001.254 As written, this statute appears to codify
the holdings of Nollan and Dolan.255 In practice, however,
251. Been, supra note 30, at 504.
252. Id.
253. See Kamenar, supra note 138, at 7.
If Nollan/Dolan did not apply to mitigation or impact fees, regulators
could easily exploit the loophole to avoid unconstitutional takings by
exacting sufficiently large impact fees to enable the governmental en-
tity to condemn that portion or interest in the land it wanted .... pay
the landowner just compensation, and perhaps have some money left
over for its general coffers.
Id.
254. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 66001 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); see also supra
text accompanying note 144.
255. Government Code § 66001(a) requires local agencies to identify the pur-
pose of the fee and the use to which it will be put, in addition to establishing a
reasonable relationship between the use of the fee and the type of development
project subject to the fee, and between the need for the public facility and the
development project subject to the fee. CAL. GOvT CODE § 66001 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995). This language can be broadly construed as codifying Nollan's es-
sential nexus test between land use conditions and their stated purpose. See
Cassidy et al., supra note 27, at 8 n.46. Government Code § 66001(b) requires
local agencies to establish a reasonable relationship between the amount of the
fee and the cost of the public facility (or portion thereof) attributable to the
development project subject to the fee. CAL. GOVT CODE § 66001 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995). This is analogous to Dolan's requirement that exactions be
roughly proportional to developmental impacts.
548 [Vol. 36
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section 66001 represents, at best, a marginally higher stan-
dard of review than the reasonable relationship test of Associ-
ated Home Builders.256
For example, the court of appeal in Ehrlich sustained
various development fees under a Government Code section
66001 challenge.257 While the court of appeal did identify the
purpose and proposed use of the $280,000 recreation mitiga-
tion fee,258 its reasonable relationship analysis required by
Government Code section 66001(a) was lacking.259 Addition-
ally, case law indicates that California courts view the lan-
guage of section 66001 as, at most, a slightly higher standard
than the Associated Home Builders reasonable relationship
test.26 o
256. See supra text accompanying notes 125-33.
257. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 478-81 (Ct. App.
1993), cert. granted and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
258. Id. at 479.
259. Government Code § 66001(a) requires a reasonable relationship be-
tween the type of development project subject to the fee, and the fee's use and
need for the public facility. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66001(a)(3)-(4) (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995) Here, the fee was to be used for replacement recreational facilities.
Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479. However, there was substantial evidence indi-
cating that the need for replacement recreational facilities was questionable,
including the court's own admission that the fee was not the result of the pro-
ject's burden on the community. Id. at 473-76. See infra text accompanying
notes 276-80.
260. Government Code § 66001 "appear[s] to expand slightly on the reason-
able relationship test previously used by [the] courts." Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 479 (emphasis added) (citing Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist.,
4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 905 (Ct. App. 1992)). In a similar vein is Balch Enter. v.
New Haven Unified Sch. Dist., 268 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1990). Balch dealt
with a challenge to a school facilities fee pursuant to Government Code § 65995.
See CAL. GOvT CODE § 65995 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995). Subdivision (b)(2) of
Government Code § 65995 requires a reasonable relationship between school
facility fees, community needs, and development-created school facility needs.
In interpreting what reasonable relationship means, the Balch court stated
that the phrase refers to 'the constitutional standard of Associated Home Build-
ers.., and its progeny, [and] it should be construed to demand no more than is
constitutionally required." Balch Enter., 268 Cal. Rptr. at 549 (citing Associ-
ated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606 (Cal.), appeal dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971)). The court of appeal went on to note that the Asso-
ciated Home Builders standard requires only an indirect relation between
exaction and development, or an incidental contribution between the project
and the need for a particular exaction. Id. Although in a slightly different con-
text, the language of Government Code § 65995 is nearly identical to that of
Government Code § 66001. Compare CAL. GoVT CODE § 65995 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995) with CAL. GOVT CODE § 66001 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995). As both
deal with development fees, presumably Balch Enterprises' interpretation of
reasonable relationship also applies to Government Code § 66001. If this is the
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Finally, even giving the generous assumption that Gov-
ernment Code section 66001 codifies the holdings of Nollan
and Dolan in any practical way, it would appear that the stat-
ute does not codify Dolan's requirement that public agencies
engage in individualized determinations before requiring de-
velopment exactions.26 1
Clearly, nonpossessory land use regulations involve seri-
ous risks that caution against further use of the easily met
reasonable relationship test for assessing regulatory takings
claims. However, the economic pressures faced by municipal-
ities in California today make such a voluntary move
unlikely.2 62
3. Municipal Revenue Shortfalls and Land Use
Extortion
a. In General
The principal reason why California courts and the
Ninth Circuit have continued to use the reasonable relation-
ship test for evaluating regulatory takings claims is the eco-
nomic reality faced by municipalities. As Judge Beezer ob-
served in his Commercial Builders dissent, 263 municipalities
today face tight budget constraints due to decreased federal
funding and decreased local tax revenue.264 The response
has been to "stretch the use of exactions to the breaking
case, then Government Code § 66001 essentially adds nothing to California's
reasonable relationship test for evaluating regulatory takings.
261. In Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897,
907 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of appeal rejected an argument that Government
Code § 66001 requires a local agency to present site-specific information when
establishing the required nexus between development fees and the develop-
ment. The court stated that since Government Code § 66001(a) refers to the
"type" of development, the statute does not apply to particular projects that are
the subject of development fees. Id. See also Berwanger et al., supra note 27, at
251 ("It does not appear, however, that public agencies have construed [Govern-
ment Code § 660011 to require the 'individualized,' development-specific analy-
sis mandated by Dolan.").
262. See Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876-78
(9th Cir. 1991) (Beezer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 877. See also William H. Ethier & Howard J. Weiss, Development
Excise Taxes: An Exercise in Cleverness and Imagination, LAND USE L. & ZON-
ING DIG., Feb. 1990, at 3 ("Municipalities are searching for new means of financ-
ing services and capital improvements because of increasing judicial scrutiny
and state and federal cutbacks on financial resources.").
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point."2" 5 Ehrlich v. City of Culver City266 stands as a classic
example of police power use gone awry.267
b. The Ehrlich Case
The developer in Ehrlich sought to build thirty deluxe
townhouses where a private tennis club and recreational fa-
cility stood.268 The City of Culver City originally denied the
permit application,269 but later approved the project, subject
to the payment of a $280,000 recreation mitigation fee and a
$33,220 in-lieu art fee.27 °
The Second District Court of Appeal upheld the recrea-
tion fee against Ehrlich's takings challenge, stating it was
"rationally related" to a governmental purpose. 271 Here, the
purpose was to "mitigate the effect of the loss of land re-
stricted to community recreational use."272
The recreational facility had been privately operated
throughout its existence, and it was conceded at trial that the
developer was under no duty to operate a recreational facility
for the public. 273 The court of appeal rejected this public-pri-
vate distinction because "[t]he property was restricted to
community recreational facilities."274 However, the property
in question was zoned commercial, with only a plan for the
development of a recreational facility.275 Thus, while the
265. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877 (Beezer, J., dissenting). Ironi-
cally, the original purpose of development exactions was to prevent the
problems municipalities faced with developers constructing developments with-
out providing needed public improvements, then leaving the city to pay the bill.
See Smith, supra note 45, at 5-6. However, the use of exactions "has been
transmuted into a device by which municipalities are shifting to private land
developers the cost of facilities and social programs for the general public that
local government can no longer afford." Id. at 28. See generally Ethier & Weiss,
supra note 264 (arguing against a new form of land use regulation: develop-
ment excise taxes).
266. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied and vacated, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994).
267. "The Ehrlich case illustrates how egregiously 'extortion' has been prac-
ticed by land use regulators and sanctioned by the California courts."
Kamenar, supra note 138, at 7.
268. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
269. The denial was based "on the ground that the land-use restrictions pro-
vided needed recreational facilities for the City." Id.
270. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 139 & 244-45.
271. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476.
272. Id. at 475.
273. Id. at 472.
274. Id. at 476.
275. Id. at 471.
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property was limited to commercial use, it remains to be seen
how a plan to develop a recreational facility forever cast the
property into a recreational use, as the court of appeal
suggested.
Furthermore, there was conflicting evidence as to the
need for a recreational facility.27 6 The opinion states that the
purpose of the fee was to "mitigat[e] the effect of the loss of
land restricted to community recreational use."277 While the
Ehrlich court pointed to a feasibility study indicating that a
considerable demand for recreational facilities did exist,2 78
the developers "had been unable to operate the existing facil-
ity at a profit over a number of years."2 7 9 Additionally, the
court of appeal observed that "the mitigation fee was not im-
posed as a condition relating to the development project's
burden on the community for increased community services,
such as community recreational facilities."2 0 Both of these
findings seriously place into question the need for replace-
ment recreational facilities.
However, in an effort to appease the city, the developer
in Ehrlich donated to the city their movable equipment from
the tennis club, even agreeing to build four tennis courts for
the city in exchange for approval of the development. 28 ' Nev-
ertheless, the project was still conditioned upon payment of
the $280,000 fee.282
The trial court saw through the city's exaction scheme,
condemning the recreation fee as "an effort to shift the cost of
providing a public benefit to one no more responsible for the
need than any other taxpayer."2 3 While the use of eminent
domain was a possibility, the trial court noted "the City
would then of course have had to pay for the land. Here, in-
stead of taking land for which it would have had to pay, the
276. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473-76.
277. Id. at 475.
278. Id. at 473.
279. Id. at 475.
280. Id. at 476. Therefore, the supposed benefit that the developer received
from payment of the mitigation fee was not the use of replacement recreational
facilities, since the court admitted the project would not place a burden on the
community for such facilities. Rather, "[t]he mitigation fee was imposed to com-
pensate the City for the benefit conferred on the developer by the City's ap-
proval of the townhome project. . . ." Id.
281. Ehrlich, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 472.
[Vol. 36
LAND USE
City proposes to take not land but money. This is equally
impermissible."284
Ehrlich stands as a case study of the common dilemma
faced by developers in California. Cash-strapped municipali-
ties, in a commendable effort to provide public services, are
increasingly turning toward various nonpossessory develop-
ment exactions as a source of funding public needs.285 Unfor-
tunately, the situation is approaching extortionate levels.
While the developer in Ehrlich chose to fight the city's condi-
tions, that response is the exception, not the norm.286
4. The Typical Developer Response
Professor Babcock has effectively summarized the prob-
lem faced by developers when their projects are conditioned
with various exactions:
[O]ne can imagine the initial reaction of the "extractee" -
outrage. In each case he surely went to his attorney and
asked two questions: (1) How long will it take to get a
final answer in court if we challenge this condition?; and
(2) How much will it cost?
The answers probably were: (1) It will take three to
four years, with the possibility of defeat; and (2) It will
cost tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars.
By the time the developer approaches his attorney, he
has invested a large sum of front-end money and has a
great deal of interest in obtaining a permit. Moreover, he
wants the permit immediately. He takes out his pencil,
does some calculating, and decides to pay up.2 8 7
Certainly, the municipalities who impose various kinds
of possessory and regulatory exactions on developers are not
oblivious to the financial situation just described. This is
what makes their position as permit giver so powerful.288
While certain land use regulations are beneficial to the devel-
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 263-65.
286. See discussion infra part IV.E.4.
287. Richard F. Babcock, Foreword to Exactions: A Controversial New
Source for Municipal Funds, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (1987).
288. As one commentator noted, "[tihe fact that developers are willing to pay
suggests the power of the local government's position, not the reasonableness of
the exaction. Though inequitable, it is much cheaper and easier for developers
to accept exactions than to challenge the regulations in court." Theodore C.
Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Perspec-
tive, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 518 (1988).
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opment and community alike, increasingly the trend is to ex-
tract from private developments funds that primarily benefit
the public at large. 289 This turn of events runs completely
counter to the U.S. Supreme Court's clear command that in-
dividuals not bear public burdens on their own.2 0
V. PROPOSAL
To ensure that land use regulations are applied in a fair
and equitable manner, the takings analysis supplied by Nol-
lan and Dolan291 should be applied by California courts and
the Ninth Circuit to all takings claims, not just challenges to
possessory exactions.
First, in evaluating every kind of takings claim, the es-
sential nexus test should be applied.292 For a land use regu-
lation to be constitutionally valid, an essential nexus between
the regulation and the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation must be demonstrated.293 Further, the reasons
must be so compelling as to justify an outright permit de-
nial.294 Application of the essential nexus test to nonposses-
sory land use regulations is necessary to keep governmental
entities from arbitrarily requiring various dedications and
fees which have little or no relation at all to the stated rea-
sons for the regulations. At a minimum, the essential nexus
test forces municipalities to substantially relate the proffered
regulation to some legitimate state interest. 'For example,
both the floodplain easement and bicycle pathway in Dolan
were sufficiently related to legitimate governmental inter-
ests, the prevention of flooding and mitigation of traffic,
respectively.2 95
Second, once a solid connection has been established be-
tween a land use regulation and its purposes, Dolan's rough
proportionality standard should be applied to see if the regu-
lation, be it possessory or regulatory, goes too far.296 Essen-
tially, this test determines whether the land use regulation is
289. See supra text accompanying notes 263-65.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 236-38.
291. See discussion supra parts M.0, II.F.
292. See discussion supra part 1.C.2.
293. See discussion supra part II.C.2.
294. See discussion supra part II.C.2.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
296. See discussion supra part II.F.2.
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proportional, in a rough sense, to the impact that the develop-
ment project will have on the community. 297
The rough proportionality standard will operate to ferret
out land use regulations that are disproportionate to the bur-
dens created by the project. This will have the effect of over-
turning the present California rule that only an indirect rela-
tionship need exist between exaction and burden to sustain a
land use regulation.298 If the burdens created by a specific
development are not the main reasons for the exaction, as in
the Grupe case,299 presumably there are other, silent reasons
for the exaction. In such a case, no rough proportionality
would exist between the condition and the development's im-
pact on the community, because the exaction and the reasons
advanced therefor would have little to do with the burden cre-
ated by the project. In other words, when only an indirect
relation between exaction and burden is proffered in an at-
tempt to sustain a land use regulation, the rough proportion-
ality test should operate to invalidate the regulation.
Third, when a governmental entity conditions an individ-
ual permit application, the burden should be on the entity to
make an individualized determination that the land use reg-
ulation is in fact roughly proportional to the impact which the
development will have on the community.300 This will have
the effect of eliminating those regulations that are justified
on the basis of generalized findings not particular to the de-
velopment in question. °1
297. See discussion supra part II.F.2.
298. See discussion supra part II.E.l.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
300. See discussion supra part II.F.3.
301. For example, the low-income housing fee in Commercial Builders would
fail the individualized, rough proportionality determination mandated by Do-
lan. Compare Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992) with Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.
Ct. 2309 (1994). The City of Sacramento made no attempt to show how the
particular development in question would aggravate the low-income housing
shortage, relying instead on a city-wide consulting firm study that dealt with
the low-income housing problem generally. See supra text accompanying notes
104-16, 241-43. For the low-income housing fee to be constitutional, the City of
Sacramento would have to demonstrate, quantitatively, that the particular de-
velopment would actually lead to some measurably increased need for low-in-
come housing. See supra text accompanying note 112. The in-lieu art fee in
Ehrlich would also be found unconstitutional under Dolan's individualized de-
termination, because Culver City put forth no findings as to how the project in
question would impact the arts. See supra text accompanying notes 244-45; see
also Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993), cert.
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VI. CONCLUSION
California courts and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted
prior U.S. Supreme Court takings cases as applying only to
possessory interests in land.3 0 2 The Court's most recent tak-
ings case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, °8 raises the question
whether California courts and the Ninth Circuit should con-
tinue this restrictive approach, or evaluate all takings claims
using the Nollan-Dolan tests.3 °4
This comment has argued that both possessory and non-
possessory land use regulations should be examined, when
challenged, by the essential nexus and rough proportionality
tests. 0 5 Such a rule is necessary to alleviate the extreme def-
erence that California courts and the Ninth Circuit give to
governmental entities in imposing nonpossessory land use
regulations.3 0° The language of Nollan and Dolan, coupled
with the Court's command that takings claims require
heightened scrutiny, in addition to avoiding the singular
funding of public benefits, all dictate that California and the
Ninth Circuit abandon the reasonable relationship standard
for evaluating regulatory takings.0 7
Adherents to the possessory-regulatory distinction for
evaluating takings claims will certainly assault the proposal
advanced by this comment as a windfall to developers. While
proper application of the essential nexus and rough propor-
tionality tests will certainly operate to screen out exactions of
the Ehrlich type,30 8 governmental bodies will still be able to
condition development permits on the provision of needed in-
frastructure. However, the more tenuous the connection be-
comes between the regulation, its stated purpose, and the im-
pact of the development, the greater the chances that the
land use regulation will be held unconstitutional.
granted and vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994); Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2309. Again,
to be constitutional, the city would have to individually determine how the arts
would be impacted by approval of a particular project. Sweeping declarations
about how urbanization leads to decreased artistic opportunities are hardly
enough to constitutionally mandate the payment of tens of thousands of dollars
by developers. See supra note 245.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 103-23.
303. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
304. See discussion supra parts Ill, IV.
305. See discussion supra part V.
306. See discussion supra part II.D-E.
307. See discussion supra part IV.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 244-47, 268-86.
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Application of the Nollan-Dolan analysis 09 to all takings
claims will return to the development process, and California
takings jurisprudence generally, notions of fundamental fair-
ness and reason. The Nollan-Dolan analysis proposed by this
comment is congruent with the U.S. Constitution and U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and recognizes that private
property rights are just as important, in the constitutional
sense, as every other civil right that Americans enjoy.
Jason R. Biggs
309. See discussion supra parts II.C, II.F.
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